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A RESPONSE TO COMMENTS ON "JUDICIAL ACTIVISM"

LIBERTY'S SAFETY NET
Suzanna Sherry

I

AM HONORED AND HUMBLED by the breadth and depth

of the

responses to my essay on judicial activism, including Richa. rd
Epstein's very generous introduction. Each of the contributors
has packed a tremendous amount of insight and information

into an impossibly limited number of words, and the comments will
be extremely useful as I go forward with the project of turning the
original essay into a book.
My essay might be characterized as a rhetorical call to arms, an
undifferentiated embrace of judicial activism. Three of the commen
tators provide very helpful substantive support for the call to arms,
and two others offer refinements that call into question the lack of
differentiation. I consider all five to be friendly amendments to my
motion for increased judicial activism, and will therefore consider
them relatively briefly.
Both Scott Gerber and Diane Mazur write with expertise that I
lack, each in a way that deepens and enriches my arguments. I plan
to read both their books1 and incorporate their arguments into my
own, and I am grateful for their help.
Herman 0. Loewenstein Prefessor
1

ef
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SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY (2011); DIANE H. MAZUR, A MORE PERFECT MILITARY:
How THE CONSTITUTION CAN MAKE OUR MILITARY STRONGER (2010).
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Gerber makes the point that twenty-two centuries of political
theory support judicial activism - and what a feat, to condense
twenty-two centuries into five hundred words! I wholeheartedly
agree with him that "without political theory America's constitu
tional framers could not have used the lessons of history" to create
an independent, liberty-preserving judiciary. He mistakes my point,
however, if he understands me to argue that political theory weak
ens my case. My quarrel is not with political theory but with all
encompassing constitutional theories that aim to answer every con
stitutional question through simple algorithms, and with (some)
political scientists, who reduce the discipline of constitutional law to
the study of raw politics. As I have argued elsewhere, all-encom
passing constitutional theories are both impractical and ineffective;
they neither produce certainty nor constrain judges. 2 I also take is

sue with the "attitudinalist" political scientists who attribute every
judicial vote to the judge's political preferences, viewing judges as

legislators in black robes and thereby impoverishing our constitu
tional discourse. 3 These political scientists, now joined by many
constitutional scholars,4 flatten and coarsen the insights of the legal
realists into two binary oppositions - one between law and politics
and another between liberals and conservatives. This worldview
produces a crude practical skepticism that makes deference to the
popular branches seem the only reasonable alternative to Hand's
bevy of Platonic Guardians. 5 Gerber and I both seek to provide a
2

See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002).

3

See, e. g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).

4

See, e. g. , Barry Friedman, The Importance ef Being Positive: The Nature and Function
72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2004); Robert Post, Foreword: Fashion
ing the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths ef the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002).
efjudicial Review,

5

LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). For elaboration of the argument
in the text, see Suzanna Sherry, Democracy's Distrust: Contested Values and the Decline
if Expertise, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 7 (2011), at www.harvardlawreview.org/issues
/125/novemberl 1/forum_738. php.
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richer and more nuanced description of constitutional adjudication,
in

which judicial activism moderates the worst aspects of politics

rather than replicating them.
Mazur focuses on how judicial deference leads to unaccountabil
ity and encourages "professional rot . . . arrogance, and hubris" in
the institutions that are unaccountable. Her example is brilliant,
moving, and persuasive: She argues that the Court's extreme defer
ence to the military over the past thirty years is at the root of the
current crisis of sexual assaults in the military. All I can add to her
1malysis is to note the obvious: The military is not the only example
although it is surely one of the strongest - of unaccountability
leading to excess and poor decision-making. From over-indulged
children to an under-constrained Congress, thosic who know their
.1ctions will not be subject to effective oversight are prone to bad
behavior. The founding generation knew this, and divided power
i\ccordingly; of particular relevance here, they tried to create both a
judiciary independent of the elected branches and a military de
pendent on civilian leaders. As Mazur shows, we ignore their in11ights at our peril.
I read Howard Wasserman's essay as providing additional sup
port for my thesis, albeit more obliquely. I a� delighted to be cred
ited with "normalizing" judicial activism and reversing the negative
connotations of the activist label. He is probably too optimistic
when he claims that my essay will "rob[] name-callers of a previously
potent weapon," but, as the saying goes, from his mouth to God's
ear. And of course he is absolutely right that one reason to claim
activism as a positive is to move us beyond epithets to a more sub
stantive discussion of the correctness of particular constitutional de
cisions. All but the last paragraph of his comment, then, suggest that
he is supportive of my call for more judicial activism. But he closes
by saying that

they (activists)

can proudly declare "We're judicial ac

tivists. Get used to it." Shouldn't that be

we,

Professor Wasserman?

Turning now to the two friendly amendments: Both Scott Dod
tiOn and Evan Zoldan take me to task for failing to differentiate
among different types of activism. Both think that while increased
i\Ctivism is a good idea in principle, it should be focused on limited

SUMMER2013
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contexts. Dodson identifies a kind of judicial activism that might be
uniformly - or at least mostly - bad, because it reduces liberty by
increasing governmental power over individuals. He uses as an ex
ample the jurisprudence governing state sovereign immunity, which
makes it exceedingly difficult for Congress to lift that immunity and
thus makes it easier for states to do harm without fear of being sued.
Zoldan points out that as a historical matter, judicial review was
designed to remedy the "tendency of democratic majorities to act
out of passion and prejudice rather than after deliberation. " He
therefore suggests that judicial activism should be targeted at legisla
tion that is rooted in passion or prejudice.
Both Dodson and Zoldan are right in their basic insight: Not all
judicial activism is created equal. Dodson's concern about liberty
reducing activism is important, and it is certainly not limited to sov
ereign irr1.munity doctrines. This past Term's decision in

Shelby
County v. Holder6 - which invalidated the preclearance formula of the

federal Voting Rights Act and thus as a practical matter eliminated
the preclearance requirement altogether, freeing states to make
electoral changes subject only to post-enactment lawsuits - may be
another example of the problem (more on

Shelby County later).

But that kind of activism is not only, as Dodson notes, less fre
quent, it is also qualitatively different. Both the sovereign immunity
doctrines and

Shelby County raise questions of federalism: questions
whether government can act in a particular way, but about
which government can act. Activism in the whether context always

not about

enhances someone's liberty because it always constrains government
action, although there may often be conflicts that require the court
to decide whose liberty will be increased and whose will be dimin
ished. In the

which context,

by contrast, the Court confronts a choice

between constraining state governments and constraining the federal
government; it is not always easy to tell what counts as activism or
whether that activism will be liberty-enhancing or liberty-reducing.
(The same can be said about separation-of-powers questions.) Activ
ism in the name of federalism, then, can and should be distinguished.
6

133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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Parsing activism in the way that Dodson suggests is also con
sistent with the Court's role as a counter-majoritarian institution
protecting against majority tyranny. The states do not need the
courts' protection. As Herbert Wechsler pointed out almost sixty
years ago, the states are protected by the

political

safeguards of fed

eralism.7 And as Jesse Choper noted more than thirty years ago,
Wechsler' s insight suggests that there is little or no justification for
the courts to police federalism boundaries, and thus that the Court
should not review federalism-based challenges to congressional ac
tion at all, much less do so aggressively. 8 I take Dodson as reiterat
ing both Wechsler's and Choper's points, and I have no quarrel with
the idea in principle although I think it might be difficult to imple
ment in practice because federalism principles and individual rights
sometimes intersect.9
That last problem - of correctly identifying the particular con
text in order to determine the appropriateness of judicial activism also besets Zoldan's suggestion. His historical point is exactly right,
and well-illustrated by his quotations from various founding lumi
naries. Perhaps Madison put it best, defending the concept of an
unelected body to "protect the people against the transient impres
sions into which they themselves might be led" as a result of "fickle
ness and passinn" or "sudden impulses . . . to commit injustice on
0
the minnrity."1 But how are we to identify which legislation impli
cates this concern with passion or prejudice? John Hart Ely tried,
but his elegant and eloquent theory has run into multiple obstacles
in the three decades since he proposed it. 11 If as brilliant a scholar as
7

Herbert Wcchslcl', rhc
(1954).

8

JESSE H.

C!IOPf.R,

Political Sefeguards ef Federalism,

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS:

FUNCTIONAL RL'CONS!DERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
9

10

11

54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
A

SUPREME COURT (1980).

Cons ider U.S. v. Windsor, l 33 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), which invalidated the federal
Defense of Marriage Act. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion discussed both fed
eralism and individual rights.
JAMES MAlllSON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
194· 195 (Tuesday June 2b) (Adrienne Koch ed. 1966).
JOHN HART

ELY, IJhMOCRACY

SUMMER2013
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Ely could not successfully distinguish between legislation engen
dered by passion or prejudice and legislation that results from rea
soned deliberation, I am confident that no one can. One might also
argue that the behavior of Congress over the past decade or so sug
gests that Congress is incapable of reasoned deliberation and thus
that

no federal legislation should be exempt from judicial activism.

In short, then, while I have no theoretical objection to the idea
that there are many types of judicial activism, some more defensible
than others, I do have practical objections. It is all well and good to
propose that activism be confined so that it is either libertarian (as
Dodson would have it) or targeted at legislation enacted in passion
(as Zoldan urges). But we are no more likely to be able to identify
and agree on which instances of judicial activism meet those con
straints than we are to agree on which Supreme Court invalidations
are good, wise, or constitutionally sound. We have to take the bit
ter with the sweet when it comes to choosing between deference
and activism.
Aaron-Andrew Bruhl and Frank Colucci have more serious ob
jections to my call for greater judicial activism. Each makes a some
what different argument, but their bottom lines are similar: They
would make the trade-off between too much activism and too much
deference differently than I do. Colucci makes the point most ex
plicitly, warning that an increase in activism will "encourage more
false positives - and more Justices like Anthony Kennedy. " Both
Colucci and Bruhl tell us just what that trade-off looks like. Colucci
"Lawrence comes at the cost of Citizens United (or vice versa)"12

says

(1980). For critiques identifying the obstacles, see, e.g. , Michael J. Klarman, The
77 VA. L. REV. 747, 784-88 (1991);
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985);
Paul Brest, The Substance ef Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981); Laurence H.
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence ef Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Darkness at the Edge ef Town: The Contributions efJohn
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). For further evidence
Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory,

that Zoldan's restatement of Ely's idea is equally problematic, one need only con
sider the debates about whether affirmative action helps or hurts minorities and
12

whether it should be subjected to strict scrutiny.
The references are to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) and Citizens
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and points out that the activist Justice Kennedy was the only Justice
who was in the majority in both

Windsor and Shelby County. Bruhl
warns of the risk of "judicial hyp eractivity , " which he illustrates by a
laundry list of cases (including Windsor, Shelby County, and Citizens
United), some deplored by conservatives and lauded by liberals and
some exactly the reverse.
But that is precisely my point. We can't have

sor

without

Shelby County

and

Citizens United.

Lawrence and Wind

Fifty years from now

we would be more ashamed of the Court having upheld sodomy
statutes and DOMA than we will be of the Court having invalidated
the predearance formula of the VRA and campaign finance legisla
tion. At least that's my prediction, based on a modern evaluation of
the Court's past performance (I will consider later Bruhl's objection
to using the past to predict the future). And I think my view would
probably coincide with the judgment of most Americans on both
sides of the political aisle, if they could be convinced that they can't
have it both ways. Given a choice between upholding both DOMA
and§ 4 of the VRA (or campaign finance laws) or invalidating both,
my guess is that a large majority of both liberals and conservatives
would prefer to have the Court invalidate both. People cling to the
belief that they can keep the cases they like and jettison the ones
they don't only because our current political climate, our embrace
as politically motivated, and

of attitudinalist conceptions of
our obsession with the illegitimacy

judicial activism allow pundits
as illegiti-

and politicians to simultaneously
mate activism and celebrate Windsor

(<1r vit:e

away the brush by showing that the <:ases ire twa

we clear

11ame

coin, both might be viewed as more
Both Colucci and Bruhl also raise other

""'"�''1""''"'

gument that history suggests that we are
activism than with too little. Colucci Is skc�ptk:al
erty - freedom from majority tyranny
constitutional regime. In response, I refer him
lesson on the political theory of the founding

United

v.

Federal Election Comm'n,

SUMMER2013

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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ard Wasserman's comment that the Court has viewed its role that
way for at least the last half-century.
Bruhl has a different objection: He suggests that the past may not
be a good predictor of the future, given both "institutional circum
stances" and the current Court's apparent willingness to invalidate
federal statutes. I confess that I cannot prove that in the future we
will regret today's deferential cases more than we regret the activist
ones. But two fairly recent instances of deference have already been
overruled or discredited and are, I think, on their way to universal
co�demnation. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 13 the Court upheld laws ban
ning homosexual sodomy. A mere seventeen years later, the Court
overruled

Bowers

in

Lawrence,

calling it "not correct when it was de

cided."14 And as Diane Mazur points out, the extreme deference of

Rostker

v.

Goldberg15

produced a military in which sexual assault is

common. and acceptable. Not only is the nation dealing with that
crisis, it has also changed its mind about women in combat; and, as
Mazur argues more broadly,

Rostker

is an illustration of the more

general point that deference corrupts decision-making institutions
and makes them more likely to err. If Bruhl is right that "[f]or dec
ades now the Supreme Court has been plenty comfortable with its
power of judicial review," it is all the more telling that it is

still def

erential cases that are the most problematic.
As for institutional circumstances, I view party polarization and
the "sclerotic, some say broken" Congress as reasons for placing
more trust - not less - in an independent judiciary. And Bruhl's
brief description of our political woes leads me to a broader point.
Polarization and a broken Congress are symptoms of a deeper pa
thology: At least in the United States,

democracy

is broken. The

founding generation anticipated that possibility, which is why they
hoped judges would provide a backstop against tyranny. Judicial
activism is liberty's safety net; we should not cabin it just when we
need it most.
13
478 U.S. 186 (1986).

14
15

539 U.S. at 578.
453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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Finally, a few words in praise of Richard Epstein (albeit not nec
essarily in agreement with him). Praise from him is high praise in
deed, and means the world to me. And I return his affection (and
admiration) a hundredfold. Reading his introduction brought tears
to my eyes.
But I will not be adding either

Keio or a theory of property rights

to my work on judicial activism. Perhaps it is just my independent
streak again, but I have to take issue with Richard's points.

City ef New London does

Keio

v.

not make the list of universally condemned

cases for the same reason that

Lochner

v.

New York16

does not: much

as some scholars detest it, others agree with it.17 As for his broader
point, if anyone can successfully craft a comprehensive political the
ory of limited government that is both internally consistent and not
vulnerable to obvious criticisms, it is Richard. But I have the same
doubts about a comprehensive theory of limited government that I
do about other comprehensive constitutional theories. In addition,
my intuition is that any comprehensive theory that incorporates
broad notions of a right of private property is likely to run into a
major obstacle. The right to own property - especially as broadly
conceived as Richard would have it - is different in several im
portant ways from the rights at issue in the cases on my list. People
usually do not place the same value on property as they do on liber
ty. Incursions on property usually do not provoke the same revul
sion as incursions on people's bodies, ideas, or actions. And, as the
continuing debate over cases like

Keio

and

Lochner

shows, it seems

unlikely that we will ever reach consensus about where the line
should be drawn between property rights and the police power of
the government. Richard's properly limited government is someone
else's ineffective government; the same cannot be said about a gov
ernment that refrains from, for example, imprisoning people based
on their ancestry or sterilizing them based on pseudo-science. To
the extent that my argument depends on a historical consensus

It• 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

See, e. g. , Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Keio: A Qgestionfor Richard Epstein,
t�4TULSAL.REV. 751, 761-64 (2009).
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about what kinds of government actions are most likely to be even
tually perceived as erroneous, it is difficult to reconcile with a broad
view of property rights. And so we are back where I began: If we
cannot agree on what the Constitution means or should mean, how
might we determine whether judicial activism is good or bad?
In the end, then, on the ultimate question of whether judicial ac
tivism is likely to do more good than harm, history and theory can
take 'us only so far. Those who view judges as power-hungry, politi
cally driven, or irrational will never be persuaded that they are our
salvation. But I believe that federal judges as a group are among the
most ethical, professional, and disinterested decision-makers we
have. The circumstances under which they make decisions - includ
ing adversarial presentation of arguments, the transparency and rea
soned elaboration of written opinions, and the incrementalism that
is the concomitant of a precedent-based legal regime - further in
crease the likelihood of sound judicial decisions.18 Why would we
ever trust our liberty to a Congress (or a state legislature) that is at
its best political and at its worst dysfunctional? Liberty is always en
dangered, but judicial activism gives it at least a fighting chance.

18

DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS:
PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONALLAW (2009).

For elaboration, see
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